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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
This dissertation is concerned with the Explanation
and Understanding Controversy. The point of the
controversy hinges on the nature and- the method of social
science.
Originally, the debate was provoked by the empiricist
claim of the methodological unity of the sciences.
According to this claim, there is and should be a unified
methodology of all sciences, whether natural or social
science. There may be great differences regarding the
content of these sciences. However, so long as their
methodology is concerned, there should be no difference
a+-=
The empiricist conception of methodology consists in
the theory of explanation which is precisely formulated
by Hempel. According to Hempel, all theories of science,
natural or social, must conform to the theory of
explanation.
This methodological claim of the empiricist races
attack from many directions. In the present study, we
shall consider two controversialists: Winch and Gadamer.
Their positions are commonly called separatism.
In the subsequent study, our main task is twofold.
First, we shall give brief details of Hempel's theory of
explanation. Second, we shall examine the theories of
understanding expounded by Winch and Gadamer.
As regard to the separatist theories of
understanding, our concentration will follow two lines.
First, we shall discuss the separatists' attack of the
empiricist conception of methodology respectively.
Second, each separatist has propounded a method peculiar
to social science, we shall evaluate the merits of these
methods.
The conclusion I want to establish in this
dissertation is twofold. First, Winch and Gadamer failed
to provide convincing arguments in contradicting the
empiricist conception of methodology. Second, the method
they expounded are also problematic.
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•rne present stuay concerns a central issue in the
methodology of social science, namely, the controversy
between explanation and understanding. This is often
referred to as the Erklaren-Verstehen Controversy, or
simply the E-V Controversy.[1] In the main, the point of
the conflict is whether there is or should be a unified
methodology of science. Given a positive answer, it would
follow that, from a methodological point of view, there
is no essential difference between the natural and the
social sciences even though there may be marked
differences between their subject matter.
I shall call this methodological claim the Thesis of
a Unified Methodology of Science, or simply the Unity
Thesis. The central idea of the Unity Thesis was
succinctly expressed by Hempel:
...What the preceding considerations ao suggest is
that the nature of understanding, in the sense in
which explanation is meant to give us an
understanding of empirical phenomena, is basically
the same in all areas of scientific inquiry and that
the deductive and the probabilistic model of
nomological explanation accommodate vastly more than
just the explanatory arguments of, say, classical
mechanics: in particular, they accord well also with
the character of explanations that deal with the
influence of rational deliberation, of conscious and
subconscious motives, and of ideas and ideals on the
shaping of historical events. In so doing, our
schemata exhibit, I think, one important aspect of
the methodological unity of all empirical
science."[2]
2In this claim of methodological unity, Hempel was not
the precursor. This doctrine had long been adopted as the
methodological standpoint of the positivist tradition.
Philosophers like Auguste Comte and J.S. Mill had
explicitly stated this thesis well before Hempel. But a
precise and forceful formulation of a theory of
explanation together with its claim of methodological
unity had not been given until Hempel's classic paper
The Function of General Laws in History.[3]
As suggested in the above quotation, the theory of
explanation consists of the deductive and the
probabilistic model of nomological explanation to which
all scientific understanding must conform, regardless of
natural or social science. This model is often referred
to as the Covering-Law Model or the Subsumption Model of
explanation.[4] We shall turn to a more detailed
discussion of this model at short notice.
Against the Unity Thesis is the so called
Interpretative School of Social Science. Representatives
of this school mainly come from three traditions: the
Neo-Wittgensteinian School, the Hermeneutic School and
Phenomenology.[5]
The chief contention of the Interpretative School is
that the nature of the understanding of a social
phenomenon is quite different from that of a natural
phenomenon. Thus, a theory of explanation applicable to
the natural science cannot do its proper job in the realm
3of social science. Accordingly, a methodology distinctivE
to the social sciences must be established. This clam
about the methodology of social science is also known a.c
Separatism.
The chief reason constituting the separatist clam
is that there is a feature peculiar to social phenomena
that renders them different, namely, their meaning. Anc
it is precisely this feature about social phenomena that
a methodology of interpretative understanding is
necessary.[6]
This kind of understanding is traditionally caller
Verstehen, or empathetic understanding. Whether suck
empathetic understanding deserves a methodological statuE
is a chief concern of the present study. But before WE
proceed to assess the merit of this separatist claim,
note must be made about the scope of this study.
First of all, it is not my aim to embark on
thorough examination of all the three traditionE
aforementioned. Nor will I probe into the works of all
the representatives of any one of these traditions.
Instead, my attention will be paid to two philosopherE
each representing one of the traditions: Winch and
Gadamer. They represent the Neo-Wittgensteinian and the
Hermeneutics respectively.
Secondly, the debate will be drawn between Hempel on
the one hand, and Winch and Gadamer on the other where
the former represents the Unity Thesis, the latter,
4Separatism.
Besides, the position that I propose to establish
about the E-V Controversy is twofold. First, the
separatist arguments under consideration failed to
support their claims in contradicting the Unity Thesis.
Secondly, the methodological recommendations of the
separatists are problematic.
Now, let us turn to a detailed examination of the
relevant arguments.
5CHAPTER]
The Thesis of a Unified Methodology of Science
I. The Functional Conception of Science
Savoir pour Prevoir, Prevoir pour Pouvoir. This is
a famous dictum proclaimed by Auguste Comte which means:
Knowledge for Prediction, Prediction for Power.
Besides being a famous slogan, this dictum had also
accommodated a fundamental ideal for the positive science
of sociology.
For Comte, an alternative term for sociology was
social physics. Hence, obviously what Comte's mind
had about the ideal of sociology was analogous to
physics. It goes without saying that the power modern
physical science proffered human being is blatantly
inconceivable by their ancient predecessors, yet
desperately admired.
With the advent of modern physical science, man was
endowed with the practical power to manipulate their
natural environment. Consequently, they have
successfully raised their status of total subservience to
nature. This, of course, was brought about by subsequent
changes of natural conditions.
Inheriting the legacies of the French Revolution,
Comte and his contemporaries were extremely perturbed by
the existing social upheavals. This was the historical
6scenery where Comte found a motive to search for a new
science in order that man could take better control of
their society.
It is not my aim here to engage in tracing the
history of science. Nor do I want to offer a
justification for Comte's motive. But certain historical
considerations often help locate where we are, even in
philosophical thinking.
Comte' s aspiration in founding a science of sociology
suggested a kind of knowledge about society and human
being similar to natural science. This similarity
consists in the notion of prediction.
This notion comprises the kernel of the positivist
conception of knowledge. And it is called by Reichenbach
the functional conception of knowledge.[l] Knowledge,
accordingly, must display the function of prediction if
it deserves its own title.
Of course, there may be many other ways of using the
term 'knowledge', and this is actually the case in the
history of philosophy. But an analysis of this concept
is an unnecessary complication here. We can be liberal
in terminological conventions. Hence, we postulate that
the functional conception of knowledge is one amongst the
possible meanings of the word 'knowledge', which
corresponds to the concept of science. It converges to
the notion of prediction.
7II. Prediction and foretelling
nowever, znis postulation requires further
clarification of the sense of the word prediction.
What is the magic behind prediction that gives man
power? What does it mean to say that scientists make
predications? On what grounds do we or should we believe
in a piece of prediction?
First of all, we must distinguish the concept of
prediction from mere foretelling. When someone asserts,
at time t, that a certain event E will happen at some
later time, say t+i, he is, so to speak, trying to
foretell the event E. In this sense, both the physical
scientists and the religious prophets foretell.
For instance, when a scientist asserts that a lunar
eclipse will happen at a certain later time, or when a
prophet proclaims that a certain city will be destroyed,
both foretell the happening of an event. But we cannot
say that both of them predict.[2]
What makes them different is that when a scientist
predicts, he possesses theoretic ground for his
prediction. Whereas for the prophet, his foretelling is
not based on theoretic knowledge, especially when he says
that his ground for this-prophecy comes from God.
But of course, we cannot preclude the possibility
that the prophet also possesses theoretic knowledge to
sunnort his prophecy. If this is the case, however, then
8his claim is scientifically supported. It should be
noted that it does not matter who foretells the
important question is whether the foreteller possesses a
justification. If his claim is scientifically grounded,
i.e. based on theoretic knowledge, then he predicts
scientifically.
But even now we can still ask: How can a scientific
theory provide a justification for a prediction?
Further, what exactly does it mean to provide a
justification for a prediction?
The answer for these questions has been provided by
Hempel's theory of explanation. But further analysis
shows that it also answers questions germane to
scientific prediction. We shall later show that the two
notions, explanation and prediction, are logically
symmetrical. Answering the one also answers the other.
As we shall see, Hempel's theory of explanation has
an important methodological bearing. Now let us first
proceed to a brief examination of this theory of
explanation.
9III. The Covering-Law Theory of Explanation [31
This theory claims that explanations in science are
analyzable in terms of the following two models: the
deductive model and the probabilistic model. These two
models are called the covering-law models of explanation.
As far as an explanation is concerned, there must be
an explanandum, i.e. the object to be explained and an
explanan, an argument meant to explain the explanandum.
An explanandum consists of a statement describing an
event. In answering a why-question of the occurrence of
an event, we put forward an explanan.
But we may ask: under what conditions do we regard
an explanan acceptable? In other words, how do we tell
between good and bad explanations? What conditions must
a good scientific explanation fulfil?
These related questions constitute the main task of
the covering-law theory of explanation. Given any
particular description of an event, this theory is
concerned to lay down the logical requirements of an
adequate explanation. For reasons to be shown later,
these requirements constitute the essential or necessary
conditions for a scientific explanation.
As just mentioned- the theory consists of two
explanatory models, deductive and probabilistic, each
propounding a logical structure of an explanation. And
according to the covering-law theory, an explanation is
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adequate only if it satisfies the requirements of either
one of the two models.
Now let us examine the two models in turn and see how
they are related to the notion of prediction.
(1) The Deductive Model
This model is also called the deductive-nomological
model of explanation. The basic idea is that an explanan
consists of covering laws all of which are of strictly
universal form, i. e. all of these laws are universal laws
stating that in all cases where a certain complex of
conditions, say F, is satisfied, an event of kind G will
occur. Put in symbolic notation: (x) (Fx-? Gx). (4]
In addition to universal laws, an explanan also
comprises certain statements describing relevant initial
conditions. These initial statements, i.e. statements
describing initial conditions, together with the relevant
universal laws must jointly entail the explanandum in
order to offer the latter a Deductive Explanation.
(2) The Probabilistic Model
This second kind of explanatory model is similar to,
but not identical with, the previous one. The explanan
consists both of covering laws and initial statements.
But in this model, the covering laws are of
probabilistic-statistical form. The idea underlying this
kind of explanation is not that the explanan provide a
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deductive support, or explanation, for the explanandum
rather, it only provide the latter an inductive-
probabilistic support.
Roughly speaking, a probabilistic law has the
following form: the statistical-probability (the long-
run relative frequency) of the occurrence of an event of
kind G under certain complex conditions of kind F is q,
where 0 q 1. Schematically, a probabilistic law can
be written thus: p(G,F)=q.
In a scientific explanation of the probabilistic
kind, therefore, the explanan which comprises some
probabilistic law, or laws, and some initial statements
must lend the explanandum a certain degree of inductive
support.[5J
Generally speaking, any acceptable explanation
serving scientific purposes must be an explanation either
of the deductive or of the probabilistic kind. An
explanandum being explained by universal laws or
probabilistic laws, i.e. being rendered deductive or
inductive support, is said to be subsumed under some
covering laws. This explanandum is, as we shall call it,
under the subsumption condition. Further, that an
explanandum must be under the subsumption condition, i.e.
subsumed under some covering laws, in order to be
qualified as an acceptable explanation will be called the
subsumption requirement.
It should be noted that the subsumption requirement,
12
for reasons to be given instantly, is only the essential
or necessary condition for an acceptable explanation.
Now we shall proceed to examining the symmetrical
relation between explanation and prediction.
13
IV. The Symmetry of Explanation and Prediction
Actually it is obvious from the above considerations
that a scientific prediction share identical logical
structure with explanation. Both the explanandum and the
event being predicted are under the subsumption
condition. That is, they are supported, deductively or
inductively, by a certain set of covering laws.
The only difference is that, in an explanation, the
event is being explained afterwards whereas in a
prediction, the event is being predicted, viz. before its
occurrence.
But we must note that when a theory satisfies the
requirements of the covering law models, it is, then,
only potentially explanatory and potentially predictive.
That is to say, satisfying the requirements under
discussion is essential to a scientific theory but not
sufficient. A further requirement is that every
statement in the theory, which purports to provide an
explanation or prediction, must be true.
Although it is difficult to establish conclusively
the truth of a general law or a theoretical principle
--- since such a law or theory often makes general claims
ranging over cases not'- as yet examined while having
definite implications for them--- this, however, shall
not perturb us as to the acceptability of a law or
theoretical principle possessing a high degree of
14
confirmation.
Moreover, this very condition of inconclusiveness is
necessary for accommodating the possibility of
prediction. It is because if a given theory's truth is
conclusive, it means that not any one of its
consequential instances has not been examined and
confirmed. And since every examined instance is, by
definition, a past event, it follows that it is logically
impossible for such a theory to imply the occurrence of
a future event since there would be none. Hence it is a
logical contradiction to say that a theory with
conclusive evidence can predict.
As just mentioned, every potentially explanatory
theory is also potentially predictive because of their
structural identity. To echo a point discussed earlier,
the notion of explanation is in this sense related to
that of prediction. The task of science is to explain
phenomena and to provide knowledge. But one may wonder
what a scientific explanation involves--- what is the
meaning of explanation in general? The covering-law
theory propounded by Hempel is aimed at providing an
explication for this term. And the point of this
explication is, of course, to establish the criteria of
candidacy of science. These criteria are practical: a
scientific theory must be useful and its use consists in
its predictive power.
This, which we may call the functional postulation
15
)f the meaning of explanation, is certainly advantageous
)exause it overcomes the intractability of this
iultifarious term. In ordinary usage, the term explain
tarries many different meanings. Sometimes it means a
cientific explanation as when a scientist addresses his
audiences sometimes it means giving a definition as when
somebody is asked to explain a word sometimes it even
means giving an excuse as when a husband explains to his
wife why he arrives home so late, and this is not the end
Df the list.
Therefore, by this functional postulation the meaning
of explain in this sense is not a mere prescription to
which every use of the word must conform. Instead, it is
only one possible meaning of the word. But this is
central to the positivist theory of knowledge. We shall
not deal with this theory of knowledge in detail. The
only point I want to establish is that this theory, or
any theory of knowledge, must answer questions pertinent
to the nature of explanation since knowledge must provide
us an understanding of the world.
The covering-law theory is an answer i or, better, an
explicative definition, for the nature or meaning of the
word explain. It does not aim at providing an exact
description of science. 'The only concern is whether this
definition is useful and illuminating. It does not
increase our stock of knowledge this is the work of
scientists, not philosophers. But it does enhance
16
our understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge.
The reason is succinctly expressed by Hempel:
... all scientific explanation involves, explicitly
or by implication, a subsumption of its subject
matter under general regularities that it seeks to
provide a systematic understanding of empirical
phenomena by showing that they fit into a nomic
nexus.... The construal here set forth is, rather,
in the nature of an explication, which is intended
to replace a familiar but vague and ambiguous notion
by a more precisely characterized and systematically
fruitful and illuminating one.... Like any other
explication, the construal here put forward has to
be justified by appropriate arguments. In our case,
these have to show that the proposed construal does
justice to such accounts as are generally agreed to
be instances of scientific explanation, and that it
affords a basis for a systemically fruitful logical
and methodological analysis of the explanatory
procedures used in empirical science.[6]
This idea of methodological analysis, however, often
meets objections from the methodological separatists.
These objections rest on the notion of verstehen, or
empathetic understanding, which is expounded as a method
peculiar to the understanding of human action. To do
justice to both parties of this controversy, however, the
meaning of "methodology and verstehen must be made
clearer. This task will be taken up instantly.
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V. Methodology and Interpretative Understanding
In this section, we shall consider the views about
methodology and interpretative understanding of two
prominent philosophers, Hempel and Abel. Their views are
representative of the positivist tradition of the
conception of methodology.
Hempel in his classic essay The Function of General
Laws in History stated his view as follows:
This method of empathy is, no doubt, frequently
applied by laymen and by experts in history. But it
does not in itself constitute an explanation it
rather is essentially a heuristic device its
function is to suggest psychological hypothesis
... this procedure may sometimes prove heuristically
helpful but it does not guarantee the soundness of
the historical explanation to which it leads...
Nor is the use of this method indispensable for
historical explanation... whether the historian is
or is not in a position to identify himself with his
historical hero is irrelevant for the correctness of
his explanation what counts is the soundness of the
rranAral hypothesis involved...7l
Hence according to Hempel, empathetic or
interpretative understanding is only a heuristic
levice, the use of which is not necessary. What an
empathy involves is only an imaginary self-
identification which does not guarantee the soundness of
an explanation.
It is obvious that Hempel's conception of a
methodology is two fold. First, it must provide criteria
of a sound explanation. Secondly, it must establish
procedure for testing the soundness of a hypothesis.
18
,xne nature of sound explanation, according to Hempel,
is analogous to a mathematical proof.[8] In such a
proof, a theorem is deduced from a set of axioms together
with a set of rules of inference. The theorem is said to
be supported deductively by the axioms. In the case of
a scientific explanation, an explanandum is subsumed
under a set of covering-laws. The laws provide a ground
for believing the occurrence of an event.
Often when we give a causal explanation of an event,
we identify a cause. But the problem is: on what ground
should we believe that the alleged cause is a real cause
and not a causal fallacy?
For two reasons, the justification of an alleged
cause can only be provided by covering laws. First, a
law asserts general regularities between different kinds
of events. Secondly, from a covering law, the occurrence
of certain phenomena can be deduced [9], thus what counts
as the antecedent conditions, or cause, of an event is
specified by a covering law.
In regard to the procedure or method for testing the
soundness of a hypothesis, Hempel's view is coterminous
with Abel, which consists in the notion of hypothetical-
deductive method, or as Abel called it the method of
verification. And we shall discuss this instantly.
Now let us first examine Abel's view about
interpretative understanding and the nature of
methodology.
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In his classic paper "The Operation called Verstehen"
[10], Abel tried to analyze how this method of verstehen
operate in interpreting human action and then evaluate
its methodological claim.
According to Abel, the concept of verstehen as a
special method in social science is held by many
philosophers and social scientists, yet without clear
meaning and specification. He then proceeds to examine
cases where the so called method of verstehen operates
and conclude that,
"... the characteristic feature of the operation of
Verstehen is the postulation of an intervening
process 'located' inside the human organism, by means
of which we recognize an observed--- or assumed--
-connection as relevant or 'meaningful'."[ll]
Briefly, this method is concerned with establishing
the connection of observed behaviour by way of exploring
its 'meaning'. And this procedure, according to Abel,
involves three steps: (1) internalizing the stimulus,
(2) internalizing the response, and (3) applying
behaviour maxims.
The so called 'connection' of observed behaviour is
here understood as a stimulus-response relation. An
action or behaviour is understood as a response to a
stimulus. To take Abel's example, one day when the
temperature suddenly dropped to near freezing point, a
man rose from his desk to collect the wood to the
fireplace and then he lighted the fire.
Tin nlainina the man's action, viz. lighting the
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fire, it is regarded as a response to a stimulus. To
identify the stimulus is to attribute certain feeling-
states to a person encountering a particular situation.
The main 'technique' seems to be to place oneself to the
situation of the person so as to 'understand' his feeling
and then ascertain what the person would do in that
situation. In this way the observer is said to be
internalizing the stimulus and response.
How do the observer know the emotional state of the
man facing the fall of temperature? According to the
view of verstehen, the method consists in the observer's
imagination of placing himself in the situation of the
actor. In so doing, the observer is internalizing the
stimulus.
Moreover, how do the observer get to know the motive
of the actor? The man in our example, in lighting the
fire, may act out of a desire to obtain warmth or maybe
he is expecting an important guest or perhaps he is
preparing for a barbecue, and so on. There are so many
possible interpretations. In using the operation of
verstehen, the observer again internalizes the response,
i.e. to ascribe a motive to the actor. But amongst these
possibilities, which one is actually the case? This,
however, verstehen cannot tell.
As to the notion of behaviour maxim, it is
generalization linking two feeling-states together in
a uniform and imply a functional dependence
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between them. But how do the two feeling-states link
together? In what way are they functionally dependent:
The answer, according to Abel, is this:
Behaviour maxim are not recorded in any textbooks
on human behaviour. In fact, they can be construed
ad hoc and be acceptable to us as proposition even
though they have not been established experimentally.
The relation asserted appears to us as self-
evident.[12]
In short, the operation of verstehen consists in an
imaginary self-identification and asserts what is self-
evident.
However, if this is what is meant by the method of
verstehen, it is rather unjustified for its
methodological claim. In the first place, the operation
may be useful in discovering possible hypotheses. Yet it
does not establish its probability. In other words, the
operation, according to Abel, is not a method of
verification, since it does not specify procedures by
which we ascertain the probability of a hypothesis. And
from the point of view of verstehen alone, any
connection that is possible is equally certain.[13]
Secondly, this operation rests too much on the
personal experience of the observer. Even if every
different observer is equally imaginative, what appear to
be self-evident to one observer may not be so to
another. Therefore, the dependence of the behaviour
maxim on the notion of self-evidence is a case of
misplaced familiarity. Actually what appears
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self-evident may not be true, and what is true may not
be self-evident. What is considered to be true must be
ascertained by experimentation and subsequent collection
of reliable statistical data.
It is clear from the above discussion that Abel's
conception of methodology consists in the method of
verification. This is usually called the hypothetico-
deductive method in the philosophy of science. In brief,
the idea underlying this method is that scientific
investigation starts with hypothesis, whose discovery may
only be by a hunch, as Abel calls it.
However, a scientific methodology is not concerned
with the ways of discovery. Instead, it only concerns
the context of justification, or verification, that is,
the way by which we proceed to establish the probability
of a hypothesis. At this point all positivists agree.
And Hempel's theory of explanation is actually only the
other side of the same coin. The relation of a
hypothesis with its confirming instances is the same as
the relation of a covering law with its explanandum.
The only difference between a hypothesis and a
covering law is a matter of status. Before being placed
under experimentation, a hypothesis is merely a hunch or
conjecture formulated ih the form of a proposition. If
it is disconfirmed by continuing evidence, it is then
rejected. If, however, favourable instances accrue, it
becomes more probable. Up to a point where we cannot
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cast doubt on it for any practical reason, the hypothesis
is considered acceptable. Then we call this a law.
In sum, the positivist conception of methodology
consists of two points. First, an explanation purporting
to be scientific must satisfy the condition specified by
the covering-law models. Secondly, a scientific
methodology concerns only the context of justification
rather than discovery.
Accordingly, the so called method of verstehen is
only a heuristic device which is not indispensable for
scientific investigation.
Against this claim of methodological unity,
separatists propounding the method of verstehen raise two
points. First, this analysis of verstehen misconceives
its nature. Secondly, the method of verstehen, properly
understood, is not only necessary but also the only way
of approaching a genuine understanding of human action.





I. The Thin and Thick Theses
In his book The Idea of a Social Science and its
Relation to Philosophy, Winch undertook to expound a kind
of method for approaching the understanding of human
action peculiar to its subject matter. He first set out
to distinguish the different nature of methods employed
by a scientist and a philosopher in achieving such
understanding. What is it that distinguishes a
philosopher from a scientist in the understanding of
reality? Winch replies:
Whereas the scientist investigates the nature,
causes and effects of particular real things and
processes, the philosopher is concerned with the
nature of reality as such and in general. [1]
Throughout his book, Winch has been expressing
dissent from the method of natural science in social
studies and tried to offer a method he considered
appropriate. But what does this special method possessed
by philosopher involve? How do philosophers, geared with
this method, proceed to investigate social reality?
Before answering these questions, we must make clear
what Winch's mind has concerning the nature of the
method of natural science.
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In his criticism of J. S. Mill, it is obvious that
Winch was raising dissent from the Unity Thesis. But
there is some difference between the Unity Thesis and
Mill's conception of the method of science. Mill's
conception of the method of science, according to Winch,
consists of two points. As Winch said:
Mill does not really believe that there is a 'logic
of the moral sciences'. The logic is the same as
that of any other science and all that has to be
done is to elucidate certain difficulties arising
in its application to the peculiar subject-matter
studied in the moral sciences.
Mill regards all explanations as fundamentally of
the same logical structure and this view is the
foundation of his belief that there can be no
fundamental logical difference between the principles
according to which we explain natural changes and
those according to which we explain social
changes."[2]
Here the first point concerns the iogicai structure
of all scientific explanations. This is basically the
same as the covering-law theory of explanation. Mill,
however. entertained a further claim:
Mill goes further: 'Any facts are fitted, in
themselves, to be a subject of science, which
follow one another according to constant laws
although these laws may not have been discovered, nor
even be discoverable by our existing resources'. That
is, there may be science whenever there are
uniformities and there may be uniformities even
where we have not yet discovered them and are not in
a position to discover them and formulate them in
generalizations."[3]
This further claim, however, is quite different trom
the covering-law theory. Whereas the latter concerns
only the nature and the logical structure of an
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explanation, the former goes on to claim that any
empirical phenomena is explainable. It follows from this
claim that there exists some laws of nature that we may
not yet discover.
Winch regarded this as an empirical matter, i.e.
whether these so called laws of nature can be discovered,
we shall just wait and see as science advances. Both
Winch and Mill thought that this claim expresses clear
meaning. But whether this is so is not indubious.
At any rate, this latter claim of Mill is not adopted
in Hempel's theory of explanation. He thus expressed
his view:
This idea needs to be sharply distinguished trom
another one, which I am not proposing, namely, that
any empirical phenomena can be explained by deductive
or inductive subsumption under covering laws. The
idea here suggested is that the logic of all
scientific explanations is basically of the covering-
law variety, but not that all empirical phenomena are
scientifically explainable... The question whether
all empirical phenomena can be scientifically
explained is not nearly as intelligible as it might
seem at first glance, and it calls for a great deal
of analytic classification. I am inclined to think
that it cannot be given any clear meaning at all but
at any rate, and quite broadly speaking, an opinion
as to what laws hold in nature and what phenomena can
be explained surely cannot be formed on analytic
grounds alone but must be based on, the results of
empirical research. [4]
Hence, in Hempel's view, the idea that all empirical
phenomena can be scientifically explained is not a notion
having a clear meaning. The extent to which empirical
phenomena can be explained is, at least, an empirical
matter.
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In order that our discussion be concise, a convention
in terminology can be conveniently made. We shall call
the version of the Unity Thesis propounded by Hempel the
Thin Thesis and the version by Mill, consisting of the
further claim just discussed in addition, the Thick
Thesis.
In our subsequent discussion of winch's position of
separatism, attention will be drawn in the light of the
distinction between the Thin and the Thick Thesis.
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II. Criticism of the Unity Thesis
In this section, we shall examine Winch's two main
arguments against the Unity Thesis. They concern the
problems of regularity and interpretation respectively.
First of all, Winch considered a way of comprehending
human society which is likely to be suggested by the
followers of Mill. As he said:
A follower of Mill might concede that explanations
of human behaviour must appeal not to causal
generalizations about the individual's reaction to
his environment but to our knowledge of the
institutions and ways of life which give his acts
their meaning. But he might argue that this does not
damage the fundamentals of Mill's thesis, since
understanding social institutions is still a matter
of grasping empirical generalizations which are
logically on a footing with those of natural science.
For an institution is, after all, a certain kind of
uniformity, and a uniformity can only be grasped in
a cseneralization. f 5l
In approaching an understanding of numan oenaviour,
according to Winch, a reference might be directed to the
uniformities of social institutions. And this so called
regularity or uniformity is the constant recurrence of
the same kind of event on the same kind of occasion.
Thus, statements of uniformities presuppose judgements
of identity.[6] What is to count as the same or
different events must appeal to certain criteria.
But what can these criteria be?
According to Winch, the criteria of identity must be
relative to some rules: two events which count as
qualitatively similar from the point of view of one rule
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would count as different from the point of view of
another. So to investigate the type of regularity
studied in a given kind of enquiry is to examine the
nature of the rule according to which judgements of
identity are made in that enquiry. Such judgements are
intelligible only relative to a given mode of human
behaviour, governed by its own rules.[7]
In a sense, both the physical and the social sciences
call for judgements of identity so long as the notion of
same kind of events is involved. And in both cases,
rules must be invoked as the criteria of identity.
Nevertheless, this superficial similarity between the
physical and the social sciences, according to Winch,
does not justify the claim that they must employ the same
methodology.
Instead, Winch aspired to show that the notion of
a human society involves a scheme of concepts which is
logically incompatible with the kinds of explanation
offered in the natural sciences.[8]
What is this scheme that renders it a special status?
In what sense is it logically incompatible with the kinds
of explanation offered in the natural sciences?
The crux hinges on the notion of a rule. Although
both sciences employ rules in making judgements of
identity, yet the rules they employ are different in kind
rather than a difference of degree. And it is this very
difference, Winch argued, that makes it irrelevant and
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miss the point if one tries to understand an action in
terms of the explanatory model of the natural sciences.
Now, before we probe into the matter deeper, let us
first examine the alleged differences between the rules
employed in the natural and the social sciences.
According to Winch, the rules relevant in the natural
science are those governing the procedures of
investigators in the science in question.[9] To use
Winch's own example:
For instance, someone with no understanding of the
problems and procedures of nuclear physics would gain
nothing from being present at an experiment like the
Cockcroft-Walton bombardment of lithium by hydrogen
indeed even the description of what he saw in those
terms would be unintelligible to him, since the term
'bombardment' does not carry the sense in the context
of the nuclear physicists' activities that it carries
elsewhere. To understand what was going on in this
experiment he would have to learn the nature of what
nuclear physicists do and this would include
learning the criteria according to which they make
judgements of identity-11(10]
Hence, in order to understand a scientitic
experiment, one must possess knowledge of the discipline
which implies his knowing the rules governing activities
of the discipline. But two kinds of rules here must be
distinguished.
The first is the scientists' relation to the
phenomena which they investigate. It means that in the
course of his investigation the scientist applies and
develops the concepts germane to his particular field of
study.[1l] So this kind of rules concern the correct
ways by which the scientist applies the relevant
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concepts.
However, the scientist's ability in applying the
first kind of rules rests on a second kind of rules. They
are rules governing his relation to his fellow-
scientists.[12] This latter kind of rules, instead of
being applicable to the 'object of study', determines the
way a scientist participates in an established form of
activity with his fellow-scientists.[13]
It is obvious that the two kinds of rules are quite
different in nature. Both of them rest on a social
context of common activity. However, whereas the former
kind applies to the object of study, i.e. the physical
phenomena, the latter kind applies to the form of
activity governing the scientists such as their mode of
communicating with one another. And as just mentioned,
the former kind of rules presupposes the latter. Without
any previous understanding of the nature of scientific
activity in the sense of personal participation, one does
not and cannot know whether a certain concept applies in
a particular case.
More than this, Winch argued that the judgements of
identity of events in natural science are based on rules
of the second kind. That is, a scientist must be able to
follow rules governing'' his relation to his fellow-
scientists so that they are capable of communicating with
each other about what they are doing.
I think the point here made is that what is to count
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as the same event in the physical realm is to be judged
by the scientists. The 'sameness' of events is not their
intrinsic property but one that is conferred upon them by
the scientists. It follows that it is the physical
scientists who decide what rules and what concepts are to
be applied to their 'object of study' and decide what are
the rules by which they communicate with each other.
However, Winch argued that as far as the
understanding of social institutions is concerned, social
scientists are not as privileged as the natural
scientists since the latter determine the criteria of
identity of their subject matter. Therefore, one cannot
say that the sameness of two social actions must be
understood 'in relation to the rules governing
sociological investigation'. The reason, as Winch put it,
is that:
here what the sociologists is studying, as well as
his study of it, is a human activity and is therefore
carried on according to rules. And it is these rules
rather than those which govern the sociologist's
investigation, which specify what is to count as
'doing the same kind of thing' in relation to that
kind of activity.[14]
The point is clear: human activity, the soclologiszs-
'object of study', is carried on according to rules,
whereas physical events are not. We cannot intelligibly
say of rules intrinsic'to physical events. But in the
realm of human activities, not only are there rules
intrinsic to them, they cannot be sensibly understood
without invoking these rules. The employment of rules
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governing sociological investigation is, therefore,
misleading.
To use Winch's example again:
Consider the parable of the Pharisee and the
Publican. Was the Pharisee who said 'God, I thank
Thee that I am not as other man are.' doing the same
kind of thing as the Publican who prayed,'God, be
merciful unto me a sinner.'? To answer this one would
have to start by considering what is involved in the
idea of prayer and that is a religious question...
and this answer is given according to criteria which
are not taken from sociology, but from religion
iic--Plf_r1Si
Accordingly, the criteria of identity cannot be
sociological, instead, they must be taken from religion
itself. Owing to this special nature of social
institutions, a sociologist's relation to the performers
of religious activity cannot be that of observer to
observed.[ 16]
Rather than this, a historian or sociologist of
religion must himself have some religious feeling if he
is to make sense of the religious movement he is studying
and understand the considerations which govern the lives
of its participants.[17]
Now, Winch distinguished two kinds of understanding:
reflective and unreflective understanding. The reflective
understanding of a particular mode of social life is the
sociologist's conscious employment of concepts which may
not be taken from the forms of activity which he is
investigating, but which are taken rather from the
context of his own investigation.[18]
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But such reflective understanding must presuppose an
unreflective understanding which is an understanding
based on the concepts which belong to the activities
under investigation.[19] And how this unreflective
understanding is acquired is a matter of 'feeling' as in
the case of religion aforementioned.
To sum up, Winch's first challenge to the Unity
Thesis concerns the notion of regularities. He has been
arguing that the nature of regularities in the social
realm is quite distinguished from physical regularities.
In the course of his arguments, many concepts call
for further clarification. First, what is the meaning of
the 'rule'? Secondly, the term 'an object of study' seems
to have involved many confusions. We shall turn to these
difficulties of Winch later. Now let us consider Winch's
second challenge to the Unity Thesis.
The central issue in this second charge with the
Unity Thesis hinges on the notion of the so called
sociological interpretation. Winch has taken into
consideration Weber's account of the matter. It concerns
Weber's account of the relation between acquiring an
'interpretative understanding' of the meaning of a piece
of behaviour and providing a causal explanation of what
brought the behaviour in question about and what its
consequences are.[20]
Against such an account, Winch tried to argue that
Weber has given "a wrong account of the process of
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checking the validity of suggested sociological
interpretation.[21]
But what did Weber say about a valid interpretation?
According to Winch, there are two related points. Let us
quote from his book two nassaaes separately:
"Weber says:
'Every interpretation aims at self-evidence or
immediate plausibility. But an interpretation
which makes the meaning of a piece of behaviour as
self-evidently obvious as you like cannot claim just
on that account to be the causally valid
interpretation as well. In itself it is nothing more
than a particularly plausible hypothesis.' He goes
on to say that the appropriate way to verify such an
hypothesis is to establish statistical laws based on
observation of what happens. In this way he arrives
at the conception of a sociological law as 'a
statistical regularity which corresponds to an
intelligible intended meaning'. [22)
Weber often speaks as if the ultimate test were our
ability to formulate statistical laws which would
enable us to predict with fair accuracy what people
would be likely to do in given circumstances. [23]
The passages just quoted are Winch's formulation of
Weber's position on the matter. Next let us quote two
other passages which comprises Winch's main arguments
against Weber's position.
But I want to question Weber's implied suggestion
that Verstehen is something which is logically
incomplete and needs supplementing-by a different
method altogether, namely the collection of
statistics. Against this, I want to insist that if
a proffered interpretation is wrong, statistics,
though they may suggest that that is so, are not the
decisive and ultimate court of appeal for the
validity of sociological interpretations in the way
Weber suggests...The compatibility of an
interpretation with the statistics does not prove its
validity. [24]
...we might well be able to make predictions of
great accuracy in this way and still not be able to
claim any real understanding of what those people
36
were doing. The difference is precisely analogous
to that between being able to formulate statistical
laws about the likely occurrence of words in a
language and being able to understand what was being
said by someone who spoke the language. The latter
can never be reduced to the former...the knowledge
that he was dealing with a language is not itself
something that could be formulated statistically.
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The reason for which I quote here the long passages
is that I think it is not an easy job to give a clear
formulation of Winch's arguments because they involve a
myriad of conceptual confusions.
Winch, throughout his attempted attack on the Unity
Thesis, has been putting his effort against the notion of
regularity and statistical laws. However, his efforts
seemed to have been directed against a strawman since
the notion of statistical laws involves a systematic
ambiguity throughout his presentation.
On the one hand, 'interpretation by statistical laws'
could mean that the meaning or the use of a word, or an
expression describing an action can be figured out by
systematic observations of how people use it. In this
sense, the so called 'statistical law' is simply a
proposition about the meaning or the use of an
expression.
On the other hand, however, the phrase could also
mean that there is a certain degree of statistical
correlation between two kinds of events or actions. It
is only in this latter sense can we sensibly speak of
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prediction (of events).
There are still many other conceptual confusions in
Winch's arguments. We shall examine them later. At
present, let us consider first what Winch regards as the
proper method in studying human action.
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III. The Proper Method: Philosophical Argument
In the last section we have considered some of
Winch's arguments against the Unity Theses and pointed
out that there are certain conceptual confusions in these
arguments. At the time being, let us turn to his
positive contribution concerning what he considered to be
the proper method for acquiring a 'genuine understanding'
of human action.
Winch's main thesis on the matter is that explanation
in terms of statistical laws like those in the natural
science is totally misleading in the understanding of
human actions, and what is ultimately required is a
philosophical argument. [26]
As we have seen in the last section, Winch's notion
of 'interpretation by statistical laws' is ambiguous.
But since it was meant to launch against the methodology
of natural science, I think we can reasonably take it to
mean the prediction of events in the sense defined in the
first chapter.
Now if explanation in terms of covering laws is
irrelevant to the understanding of human action, how
should it be understood?
According to Winch,'•the ultimate requirement is a
philosophical argument.
But how does it work? And why should this 'method',
rather than the explanation by covering laws, be counted
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as the only genuine way to understanding?
In answering these crucial questions, we have to know
what Winch takes to be an 'understanding'. He said
explicitly that understanding', in situations like
this, is grasping the point or meaning of what is being
done or said.
Actually, here Winch is talking about the
understanding of a language when he said in situations
like this'. Thus he wrote:
The latter (the ability to understand a language)
can never be reduced to the former (statistical laws
about the likely occurrences of words in a language)
a man who understands Chinese is not a man who has
a firm grasp of the statistical probabilities for the
occurrence of the various words in the Chinese
language. [27]
To understand what is being said is, of course, to
understand its point or meaning. But what does it mean
to say that this is also the way by which we should
understand what is being done, i.e. an action?
The answer is that every action carries a point or
meaning like words in a language. And the way we
understand the meaning of an action should resemble the
way we understand words in a language.
Underlying this idea we find the following
assumptions:
To give an account of the meaning or a wora is LO
describe how it is used and to describe how it is
used is to describe the social intercourse into which
it enters.
If social relations between men exist only in and
through their ideas, then, since the relations
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between ideas are internal relations, social
relations must be a species of internal relations
too. [28]
social relations are expressions of ideas about
reality. [29]
From these, Winch wanted to establish that the
social relations between men and the ideas which men's
actions embody are really the same thing considered from
different points of view. [30] And their identity hinges
on the concept of internal relations. Thus Winch said
that social relations can be view in the same way in
which propositions are related to each other.
It is this very notion- internal relations of human
actions- that constitutes the kernel of Winch's
methodology of social science, viz. the understanding of
human action is the tracing of internal relations.
Three points are given to explain this. Let us call
them the Principle of Existential Non-independence, the
Principle of Internality and the Principle of currency.
(1) The Principle of Existential Non-indepenaence
This principle claims that the essential nature of
physical events and that of human actions are quite
different. In the former case, events like thunder have
an existence independent of the concepts or the ideas we
formed of them. In the latter case the relations, e.g.
between an act of command and an act of obedience to that
command cannot exist independently of the concepts. Thus
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Winch wrote:
There existed electrical storms and thunder long
before there were human beings to form concepts of
them or establish that there was any connection
between them. But it does not make sense to suppose
that human beings might have been issuing commands
and obeying them before they came to form the concept
of command and obedience. For their performance of
such acts is itself the chief manifestation of their
possession of those concepts. An act of obedience
itself contains, as an essential element, a
recognition of what went before as an order.311
Accordingly, human actions have a status of
existential non-independence which is based on the idea
that actions like command -and obedience have an
'intrinsic' relation that cannot be formed in physical
events. And this leads us to the second principle.
(2) The Principle of Internality
As we have mentioned earlier, our language and our
social relations are just two different sides of the same
coin.[ 321 In other words, a set of social relations is
possible if and only if there is an idea or a concept
formed of them.
To elucidate the point clearer, Winch proposed to
consider the general nature of what happens when the
ideas current in a society change: when new ideas come
into the language and old ideas go out of it. [33]
Such a 'change'.has'• two sides: the introduction of
'new ideas' and the waning of 'old ideas'. In the former
case a distinction must be made. To use again Winch's
example, when a biochemist discovers a new kind of germs
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which is responsible for a certain disease, we shall
preferably say that he has made a discovery within the
existing framework of ideas. [34] It happens only when
the germ theory of disease is already well developed in
the scientific language the biochemist speaks. But
compare the situation when the concept of a germ was
first introduced into the language of medicine. The
discovery, or perhaps invention, of the idea of a germ is
quite different from the discovery of a particular kind
of germ since the idea is a conceptual pre-requisite
without which one cannot sensibly speak of the discovery
of a new germ.
The introduction of the concept of a germ enables us
to speak of a certain object. The existence of the
concepts of command and obedience is analogous. it is
only when these ideas become current in a society that
the performance of the actions is possible. If a man
shouted, 'turn left!' in a commanding manner and another
person turned left but having no ideas about what an
obedient act is like, he is not obeying the command even
if he turned left. He may think that the man shouting
was just asking him to do something or just warning him.
Now the case under consideration is closely related
to the concept of following a rule. According to Winch,
even if there is a high statistical probability that the
person performed the bodily behaviour similar to what an
obedience to a command is like, we cannot say that he is
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obeying if he does not possess the concepts in question
since he is not following the proper rule.
To follow a rule means, besides knowing how to act
accordingly, that one knows under what circumstance he is
making a mistake. If it is possible to say of someone
that he is following a rule that means that one can ask
whether he is doing what he does correctly or not. [35]
In short, the person in question has to know how to
disobey in order that he has acquired the concept of
obedience.
However, if these concepts are not current in a
society, we cannot sensibly say that people in such a
society perform acts of command and obedience.
On the other hand, when an idea is on the wane,
actions in accordance with the idea is also impossible.
Take the notion of friendship:... it is the duty of
a social worker to establish a relationship of
friendship with her clients but that she must never
forget that her first duty is to the policy of the
agency by which she is employed. Now that is a
debasement of the notion of friendship as it has been
understood, which has excluded this sort of divided
loyalty, not to say double-dealing. To the extent
to which the old ideas gives way to this new one
social relationships are impoverished (or... changed).
It will not do, either, to say that,the mere change
in the meaning of a word need not prevent people from
having the relations to each other they want to have
for this is to overlook the fact that our language
and our social relations are just two different sides
of the same coin. [36]
In this example, the new ideas constituting the term
'friendship', i.e. a divided loyalty, prevent it from
being the same 'friendship' as formerly understood.
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Hence the sort of social relationship under this new idea
is conceptually different from the kind defined by the
old ideas.
By the above examples, Winch wanted to show the
meaning by which he understood the internal relations of
ideas and social relations, i.e. the intrinsic nature of
human actions. The nature of human action is different
from physical events in that the existence of the former
is impossible without the relevant ideas which is also
governed by appropriate rules in itself.
But to answer the question why the understanding of
human action cannot be based on the explanatory model of
natural science, Winch resorted to a third principle to
which we turn now.
(3) The Principle of currency
The principle maintains that the 'empiricist
methodologies of the social sciences' is not suitable for
understanding human actions or for historical
explanation. By 'empiricist methodologies' Winch meant
the Unity Thesis. And the alleged reason for its
unsuitability is this:
Since ideas and theories are constantly developing
and changing, and since each system of ideas, its
component elements being interrelated internally, has
to be understood in and for itself the combined
result of which is to make systems of ideas a very
unsuitable subject for broad generalisations. I have
also tried to show that social relations really exist
only in and through the ideas which are current in
society or alternatively, that social relations fall
into the same logical category as do relations
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between ideas. It follows that social relations must
be an equally unsuitable subject for generalizations
and theories of the scientific sort to be formulated
about them. Historical explanation is not the
application of generalizations and theories to
particular instances: it is the tracing of internal
relations. 1371
Hence, the main reason hinges on the fact that
systems of ideas are constantly changing, i.e. while new
ideas incessantly flow in, old ideas keep waning out.
In addition, since social relations exist only 'in
and through the ideas which are current in society', and
that these ideas are internally related and therefore
must be understood in and for themselves social relation
must also be understood in terms of its internal
relations.
Here, winch is implying that since the systems of
ideas keep changing all the time, the 'available
descriptions' of human actions [38] are not always the
same. There will be new systems of social relations when
new ideas are introduced. Hence, there can be no such a
thing as 'brute data' of human society [39]. Everything
we call the 'fact' about human action must be the result
of appropriate interpretation, i.e. the tracing of
internal relations involved.
It is time we sum up this chapter.
In the course of his argument, Winch has launched two
points of criticisms against the Unity Thesis. First, he
arctued that the understanding of human behaviour in terms
46
of the regularity of social institutions based on
generalizations is misleading and cannot capture the
rule-following nature of actions.
Secondly, Winch argued that an interpretation of the
meaning of an action (or the meaning of a word in a
certain language) based on statistical laws concerning
the statistical probabilities of the occurrence of a word
in a language cannot be regarded as a good attempt in
doing the job, i.e. to interpret the meaning of an
action.
However, the two arguments just mentioned are
actually directed only against the Thick Thesis. They
concern the extent to which the covering-law model
applies but not its logical structure. Thus, Winch
failed in the above two arguments to shake the foundation
of the Thin Thesis.
Besides his attempt in refuting the Unity Thesis,
Winch suggested what he considered a proper method of
understanding human actions. It is the tracing of
internal relations by means of philosophical arguments.
Now we shall turn to an assessment of this method.
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IV. An Assessment
Perhaps the most important task in assessing Winch's
arguments is rather to undertake conceptual
clarifications than to determine their validity.
One of the most perplexing concept is
'understanding'. It is systematically ambiguous
throughout Winch's argument. To use Brodbeck's
distinction of the various meanings of the term [40], we
shall find the following:
Understanding 1: knowing how to use a language.
Understanding 2: special feelings through direct
experience.
Understanding 3: to be able to imagine the feeling
of an experience indirectly.
Understanding 4: knowing the intention, motives on
Understanding 5: knowing the occurrence of an event
because of knowledge or beliefs that
there are some other events with
which the event in question is in
some ways associated, e.g. causal
connection.
To these five possible meanings of the term, we may also
add:
Understanding 6: knowing how to use a particular
word or phrase in a language.
Note that Understanding 6 is different from
Understanding 1 because whereas one knows a certain
language, he may not know the meaning of a particular,
difficult word in that language. On the other hand, one
reason involved in one's action.
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may know the use of a certain word or phrase in a
language without knowing the language as a whole, for
instance, one may know the word 'Bonjour' (good day)
without knowing French.
Winch often spoke of the 'understanding' of the
meaning of actions. And the term human action is also
juxtaposed with social relations. From the Principle of
Internality, we obtained that a set of social relations
is defined by the ideas which men's actions embody. In
other words, social relations is defined by an action-
description. They are actually the same thing
considered from different points of view.
Now at this juncture, Winch seemed to have made a
spurious identification of the meaning of actions with an
action-description. To determine this, we must first
clarify the meaning of 'the meaning of actions'.
Meaning 1 of action: the linguistic meaning or an
action-description term.
Meaning 2 of action: the intention, motive or reason
of an action.
Meaning 3 of action: the rules which govern an
action.
Making these distinctions, however, is not surricienc
in rendering the case clearer when we also consider what
Winch called the meaningful action, which is regarded as
the subject matter of social science.
According to Winch, meaningful actions are actions
qoverned by rules from which the 'sense' of an action is
49
discerned. Further, rules presuppose a social setting in
which actors live their lives and learn the rules.
Hence, meaningful actions is the same as the meaning 3
of actions.
At this point, I think it is rather unnecessary to
continue to walk in the mist by engaging in uncovering
conceptual confusions and undertaking conceptual
clarifications. The process would seem endless. We
shall concentrate on two notions maintained by Winch.
First, we shall examine what actually is understanding
in terms of rule-following. Secondly, we shall evaluate
the claim that such an understanding is incompatible with
scientific explanation.
First of all, as we have mentioned, an action is
meaningful if and only if the actor is following a rule,
consciously or unconsciously. To put the same matter
differently, when an actor performs an action, say, X.
he must have possessed an understanding of his action.
And this understanding involves his capability of
envisaging the possibility of doing not-X.[41]
This is 'understanding' from the actor's point of
view. For an observer, if he is to understand the
actor's action, he must be able to discern the rules
involved. Otherwise he is not acquiring a 'genuine
understanding' of the action. And the act of discerning
the rules must presuppose the observer's knowledge of the
actor's language. Finally, the learning of a language
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must involve the learner's participation in the form of
life of the speakers of the language.
This is especially necessary when a social scientist
is studying an alien culture. It is because the action
performed by an actor is carried out according to the
rules of the actor's culture. If an observer is
describing an action in terms of the concepts of his own
culture without any previous understanding of the
concepts peculiar to the culture he is studying, it is
even difficult to regard his descriptions as accurate
descriptions, let alone explanation.
But even if an understanding must imply previous
knowledge of a language, why is such understanding
logically incompatible with scientific prediction?
The crux, according to Winch, hinges on the actor's
capability in 'making decisions'. When an observer 0
tries to predict the behaviour of an actor N by means of
certain theories and initial condition such as O's
knowledge of N's character traits, however, the notions
which 0 uses to make his prediction are nonetheless
compatible with N's taking a different decision from that
predicted for him. [42]
It is because, unlike a generalization, we cannot
predict with certainty how an actor will interpret what
is involved in following that rule in radically new
circumstances. In such cases, decisions have to be made
and the outcome cannot be 'definitely predicted',
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otherwise we should not call them decisions.
This claim of logical incompatibility amounts to
saying that whenever there is a prediction of N's
behaviour, it is possible that he will act otherwise out
of his decisions. We must here draw a distinction in
order to obtain a clearer understanding of this claim.
The term 'action' can be distinguished in two different
senses. On the one hand, it means a certain way of
bodily movements while on the other hand it can mean
action without implying particular bodily movements.
Consider the following examples.
When a military sergeant shouted, 'turn left! ',a
soldier turned left accordingly. In this case, the
soldier is obeying a command. Imagine, again, a
gentleman in a restaurant asked the waitress the way to
the washroom and she replied, 'turn left.' The gentleman
then turned left heading for the washroom.
In a sense both the soldier and the gentleman are
doing the same thing, viz. turning left. In another
sense they are not. While the soldier is obeying a
command, the gentleman is just following a guidance.
Both performed similar bodily movements without
performing the same action.
Consider a second case where two persons A and B are
doing different things. We observe that A is swimming
like a dog in a pool while B is jogging like a duck on
the track of a sport ground. There is nothing similar in
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their physical movements. But in a sense they are doing
the same action, namely, exercising.
In the light of this distinction, it is obvious that
the following claim is ambiguous: whenever there is a
prediction of a person's behaviour, it is possible that
he acts otherwise out of his decision.
The behaviour predicted and the actor's act can
either be an item of bodily movement or an action. There
is a further equivocation involved in the word
'possible'. It can either mean the actor's actual
capability or the logical possibility of a prediction.
If the word is taken in the second sense, the above claim
becomes a truism since all scientific predictions are not
logically certain. If it is taken in the first sense,
let us see where it will lead us.
Case I: A certain bodily movement M was being predicted
of an actor. He, instead, performed M' out of his
decision.
Case II: A certain bodily movement M was being predicted
but the actor performed action K.
Case III: A certain action K was being predicted but the
actor performed a bodily movement M.
Case IV: A certain action K was being predicted but the
actor performed action K-'.
It is apparent that only Cases I and IV are relevant.
Cases II and III are unintelligible without specifying
the relation between the bodily movement and the action
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in question. But if this is done, they would then bE
reduced to either Case I or Case IV.
Consider Case II where a bodily movement was beinc
predicted. If the relation of M and K was not specified,
we cannot decide whether K logically excludes M. Anc
their relation is specified only if at least one of then
are being re-described so that they both come under the
same category in order that comparison be possible. For
instance, the descriptions 'N is raising his hands' anc
' N is exercising' do not exclude each other. In order tc
show their logical incompatibility, either one of then
must be re-described without losing its original sense.
Similarly for Case III.
Winch's claim as stated above seemed to mean Case Di
when he said that an actor can act otherwise than what
was predicted of him in the light of radically neu
situations out of his decisions. The actor's decisions-
may or may not involve change in bodily movements. If
the bodily movement does not change, he may be performing
the movement for different motives or reasons. If it
changes, he may or may not be performing a different
action. In either case he may perform an action other
than what was predicted of him out of his decision.
The crucial point is that what cannot be predicted
of an actor is his 'decision'. Because, so the argument
runs, the 'prediction' of a decision would consist in
making the decision itself just as the 'prediction' of an
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invention would involve actually making the invention.
Hence, it is a logical contradiction to say that a
decision can be predicted.
Of course, not all actions cannot be predicted. In
a large number of cases, prediction is possible.
However, in so far as the actor's decision of how to
interpret a rule in new situations is involved, since the
decision cannot be predicted, the predicted outcome loses
its certainty. In other words, Winch meant by this that
the actor's decision is an important intervening factor
affecting the certainty (or perhaps the probability) of
a prediction, which is unpredictable in principle.
Now an important corollary is that Winch's dissent
from scientific prediction has been directing against the
Thin Thesis rather than the Thick Thesis. Moreover, it
is unclear what he meant by a decision of the
interpretation of a rule in new situations.
This brings us back to the question of the meaning
of 'rule' discussed, yet unfinished, earlier. There can
be two different kinds of rules. First, definitive rule
second, regulative rule.'
By regulative rule, I mean rules such as social norms
and legal laws. This kind of rules are means of social
control by which the. conduct of the members of a society
is regulated.
But what Winch meant by the term seem to be what we
call the definitive rule. Since he said that the test
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of whether a man's actions are the application of a rule
is... whether it makes sense to distinguish between a
right and a wrong way of doing things in connection with
what he does. [43]
To use Maclntyre's example, [44] this is like the
game of chess. There are right and wrong ways of moving
pieces on the chessboard according to a certain set of
rules. If any one of the rules is violated, a chess-
player got a wrong move. And if both players insist or
violating the rules of the game, they are, by definition,
not playing the chess game.
If a chess player violates a rule, he would be
condemned not for any moral or legal reasons, he is not
playing the game of chess at all.
To recall our earlier question: what does it mean tc
say of a decision of the interpretation of a rule in nee
situations?
If the 'rule' here is meant to be a definitive rule,
it could be meant thus: In performing action K, what is
formerly considered a right (wrong) move would count as
wrong (right) in envisaging a radically new situation.
Hence, under such 're-interpretation' the actor, by
definition, is no longer performing the action K, though
he may still perform the same bodily movements.
For instance, in violating the rules of the chess
game, the players can insist that they are deciding tc
re-interpret the rules of the chess game so that one
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party always loses and the other always wins for the sake
of romance.
However, if this is what is meant by saying of a
decision or a re-interpretation, it is more accurate to
call it the changing of the rules than to call it a new
interpretation of the same set of rules. Since under the
new interpretation, the players are playing a different
game.
Similarly for the case of human actions, if there are
definitive rules for a certain action, a decision of new
interpretation would result, logically, in performing a
different action.
Now it is time we evaluate the claim that the
central concepts which belong to our understanding of
social life are incompatible with concepts central to the
activity of scientific prediction. [45]
The claim amounts to saying that whenever an action
K is predicted of an actor, he can always perform a
different action by means of an act of re-interpretation
of, or by changing, the definitive rules of the action K.
There is, however, a difficulty involved in this
claim. Consider again Maclntyre's example. [46] Suppose
that an observer predicts that an actor will perform a
certain action, namely,'-going for a walk after dinner.
The actor may be quite complacent that he can decide to
re-interpret the rules of the action so that his action
after dinner will not be an outcome of a prediction.
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But the actor runs against himself a difficulty: What
is the wrong way of going for a walk? Is walking like a
duck the wrong way of going for a walk? Is walking
towards the east rather than the west the wrong way of
going for a walk? Is walking alone the wrong way of
going for a walk?
I think Maclntyre is right in pointing out that
although many actions must be rule-governed in the sense
that the concept of some particular kinds of action may
involve reference to a rule, the concept of an action as
such does not involve such a reference." [47]
In other words, what Winch considered to be the
subject matter of social science, namely, meaningful
action, is too narrow a conception of action. Since
there are actions which do not involve definitive rules.
Hence, the concept of action does not imply rules.
Moreover, Maclntyre also pointed out that:
We can in a given society discover a variety of
systematic regularities...there are causal
regularities exhibited in the correlation of statuses
and forms of behaviour, and of one form of behaviour
and another, which are not rule-governed at all
there are regularities which are in themselves
neither causal nor rule-governed, although dependent
for their existence perhaps on regularities of both
types, such as the cyclical patterns of development
exhibited in some societies and there are the
interrelationships which exist between all these.
Winch concentrates on some of these at the expense
of the others..[ 4 81
Hence, with the concept of rule-governed action, Winch
either failed in contradicting the notion of the
regularities of social institutions or, by insisting on
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it, merely render his claim true by definition.
This is not yet the end of the story. For even if
all actions are rule-governed, Winch's conception of
social science is still too narrow. Since he
concentrates only on action-descriptions. But social
scientists are concerned with the causes and effects of
being unemployed, having kin-relation of a particular
kind, rates of population change, and a myriad of
conditions of individuals and societies the descriptions
of which have a logical character other than that of
action descriptions. [49]
Maclntyre treasures Winch's method only in so far
as it provides the whole task of the social sciences
their true starting-point. [50] It is because he agrees
with Winch that, in studying, for example, an alien
culture, he thinks that the social scientists must
acquire a previous understanding of concepts current in
that society. Beyond this, however, the method of the
natural science model should prevail.
Perhaps Winch might reply that those factors other
than action-descriptions are not or should not be the
real subject matter of social science. But if he should
endorse this assertion, further arguments are necessary.
But in any case., both Winch and Maclntyre suppose
that there is a clear meaning of what is called the
'subject matter' or the 'object of study' of social
science throughout. I want to point out that the term
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suffers from systematic ambiguity throughout the
discussion.
On the one hand, the term in question means the range
of phenomena that the social scientists intuitively want
to study, where these phenomena can be described in a
variety of ways which usually are described in ordinary
and unprecise terms.
On the other hand, the term 'object of study' could
mean the explanandum of a scientific theory in the sense
defined by the covering-law theory of explanation.
The two senses just mentioned are quite different in
that the explanandum of a theory involves a special
conceptualization of pre-theoretic concepts. Most
important of all, an explanandum is actually not a
concept, it is a statement describing the occurrence of
a space-time specific event. [51]
We shall pursue this matter in greater detail
subsequently. Two final points will be made to end the
present chapter.
First, as we have shown, the method Winch offered is
fraught with conceptual confusions. Even if his method
of conceptual analysis does work, it would seem strange
to call it a method for social science since it is not
concerned with the truth or the probability of
hypothesis.
Secondly, Winch's main argument against the Unity
mPc,-PS can be formulated in the following way:
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P: The understanding of human action should not resemble
that in the natural scientific model, because
Q: the subject matter peculiar to social science cannot
be predicted.
However, whereas P addresses the Thin Thesis, i.e.
the logical structure of explanation, Q is meant to
attack the Thick Thesis. Hence, winch failed, in the
whole process of his undertaking, to provide relevant
arguments against the central notion of the empiricist





I. Scientific vs Historical Knowledge
In engaging in the Explanation-Verstehen Controversy,
Gadamer, like Winch, is also critical of the empiricist
tradition.
The major difference Gadamer drew between the
empiricist and the hermeneutic traditions is that whereas
the former sought to establish scientific knowledge, the
latter aspired instead to what he called the historical
knowledge.
According to Gadamer, though a scientific knowledge
of human being based on the natural scientific model is
not impossible, yet it hindered a true understanding of
man. Gadamer's chief arguments against the Unity Thesis
are twofold. The first concerns what he called the
different aims of knowledge. The second pertains to the
nature of the methodology of natural science and its
relation to the object being studied.
First of all, Gadamer suggested that owing to the
nature of the human sciences, the use of the natural
scientific method is an obstacle for human self-
understanding which is the ultimate objective of the
human sciences or historical knowledge. Thus he wrote:
"..the human sciences, too, would be verifiable
sciences... However, is it not more true to say that
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the filiation of the human sciences with the natural
sciences, and the anti-idealistic and anti-
speculative controversy which they inherit at the
same time, have up to now hindered the human sciences
from moving towards a radical self-understanding?
[1]
... we must raise the question whether it is
meaningful, or valid, to look, by analogy with the
mathematicized natural sciences, for an autonomous
and specific method for the human sciences which
remains constant throughout the domains of its
application? [2]
The above quotations are words in question form. But
Gadamer's subsequent discussion of the matter affirmed
that the true understanding of the human sciences lies
elsewhere than in what is provided by the natural
scientific method.
But we can ask: In what sense does the natural
scientific method hindered the radical self-understanding
of the human sciences? What does this so called 'radical
self-understanding' embody?
These questions, according to Gadamer, concerns the
nature of the natural scientific methodology and its
relation to its object of study. Such a method is quite
'detached' from its object of study. And Gadamer wrote:
We must ask if a method which justifies detachinc
itself from he domain in question does not, in the
human science, lead to a misapprehension of the
natural mode of being specific to this domain?
[3]
Now, what Gadamer meant here Dy' aeracnea' seemea Lo
be referring to the inductive method. Thus he said:
Mill's aim was to show that the inductive metnoa
found at the base of all empirical science is also
the valid method for the domain of the moral
ciAnnP_s... THe moral sciences constitute no
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exception, Mill says, when we look for uniformities,
regularities, and laws in the interest of predicting
particular facts and events.4l
Moreover, he also said that:
the object itself must determine the method of its
own access.
and that:
every method is a method linked to the object
itself. [5]
From what Gadamer has said, I think it is fair to say
that a 'detached' method means the following: a method
whose application ranges over more than one object.
Gadamer said of this as a 'dangerous abstraction'.
[6] For the sake of convenience, let us call this kind
of method, which can apply to more than one object, the
abstractive method.
Nevertheless, there must be some way by which the
understanding of the human sciences is to be obtained.
It is this 'way' we need to give it a name: 'method'. If
the abstractive method is inappropriate in the human
science, then according to Gadamer, the appropriate
method must be one that applies only to one object so
that it is 'linked to the object itself'.
I am not sure whether Gadamer was aware of the
logical consequence that if there are infinitely many
objects of study, then there must be an infinite number
of methods.
But Gadamer insisted that the 'true intention' of
historical knowledge is different from that of empirical
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science in the sense defined by the empiricists. It is
only by means of historical knowledge that we can
guarantee a genuine foundation for the human sciences.
[71 Gadamer maintained that:
... the true intention of historical knowledge is
not to explain a concrete phenomenon as a particular
case of a general rule, even if this had to be
subordinated to the purely practical aim of an
eventual prediction. In actuality, its true
goal-- even in utilizing general knowledge-- is to
understand an historical phenomenon in its
singularity, in its uniqueness. Historical
consciousness is interested in knowing, not how men,
people, or states develop in general, but, quite on
the contrary, how this man, this people, or this
state become what it is how each of these
particulars could come to pass and end up
specifically there. [8]
For the sake of convenience, we snail call tnis
contention the Uniqueness Thesis, viz. an object must
be studied in its singularity and uniqueness, and not as
a particular case of a general rule.
Obviously, unlike winch, Gadamer is not maintaining
that scientific prediction is impossible in human
affairs. He maintains rather that there is an entirely
different notion of knowledge and truth [9] embodied
in the historical knowledge.
So much on the contrast between the scientific and
the historical knowledge. It is time we turn to a
scrutiny of what is involved in this so called historical
knowledge. After that we shall evaluate its claim
against the Unity Thesis.
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II. The Proper Method: Historical Consciousness
In his discussion of historical knowledge, Gadamer
has repeatedly made emphasis on an 'autonomous mode of
knowing in the human sciences' and claim that it is
impossible of being 'reduced to the natural scientific
idea of knowledge'. [10]
This claim of irreducibility is embodied in the
Uniqueness Thesis discussed in the last section: because
the historical knowledge of the human sciences is to
explore the singularity or uniqueness of an object, this
task cannot be done by means of the abstractive method
embodying the method of natural science.
In the present section, we shall examine the nature
and the method distinctive of historical knowledge.
To begin with, the central idea historical knowledge
comprises is what Gadamer called the 'historical
consciousness'.
We understand historical consciousness to be the
privilege of modern man to have a full awareness of
the historicity of everything present and the
relativity of all opinions. [11]
In other words, historical consciousness is the
consciousness of two things: first, the historicity of
everything present second, the relativity of all
opinions. To bring these two ideas into awareness or
consciousness is the beginning of historical knowledge.
But our first question is: what do these two ideas
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involve?
First of all, they concern the nature of all
judgements or 'opinions'. That they are all relative
because of the historicity of everything is the message
the notion of historical consciousness wanted to impart.
Let us see what this claim of relativity means.
According to Gadamer, every opinion is embedded in
a tradition which is a historical product. A 'tradition'
is a complex of traditionally assumed truths and is:
the obvious scale of our current life, in the
perspective of our institution and from our acquired
values and truths.
the historical horizon which is coextensive with the
life we live and have lived. [12]
Since every opinion presupposes a tradition, it is
also, as Gadamer called it, prejudiced. Moreover, that
every opinion is prejudiced is inevitable since nobody
can escape from historicity. Even as historians, that
is, as representatives of a modern methodic science, we
are members of an unbroken chain through which the past
addresses us. [13]
It is clear that central to the claims of relativity
and historicity is the concept of tradition. Everyone is
inescapably a product of a certain historical tradition,
living in and being moulded by it. Hence, any judgements
made by a person presupposes a certain complex of ideas.
In this way, every judgement is prejudiced.
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To put it in another way, what Gadamer says amounts
to arguing that objective knowledge is impossible. By
'objective knowledge' he means knowledge freed from any
particular perspectives.
Now, the problem facing Gadamer is that in revoking
the possibility of objective knowledge, is he propounding
a type of epistemological relativism, i.e. every
judgement is as correct and as incorrect as any other
judgements? If so, it follows that assertion P is as
correct as the assertion not-P.
It is perhaps rather precarious in formulating
Gadamer's position as a dilemma between objectivism and
relativism. Because, as we shall discuss later, it is
unclear to say of a piece of knowledge that it is based
on a particular perspective or is prejudiced.
Nonetheless, in order to obtain a fuller appreciation
of Gadamer's theory of historical knowledge before we
criticize it, let us leave the matter for the time being
and concentrate on other equally important aspects of his
theory.
We shall consider first, what is involved in
interpretation. Secondly, what is understanding and its
relation to historical knowledge.
There are four points pertaining to Gadamer's notion
of interpretation. First, it is a reflexive posture
towards tradition. Secondly, interpretation is
necessary when the meaning of a text is not understood at
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first sight, but whatever is immediately evident,
whatever persuades us by its simple presence, does not
call for any interpretation. [14]
Thirdly, interpretation is applied not only to texts
and verbal tradition, but to everything bequeathed to us
by history thus, for example, we will speak not only of
the interpretation of an historical incident, but also
the interpretation of spiritual and mimed expressions,
the interpretation of behaviour, and so forth. [15]
Finally, erhaps the most perplexing point is that
in interpreting we must look beyond the immediate sense
in order to discover the 'true' hidden meaning.[16]
This is perplexing because it seems to conflict with the
second point that what is immediately evident does not
call for any interpretation. On the one hand, we are
told that interpretation is not necessary for whatever is
'immediately evident' on the other hand, however, we
must look beyond the 'immediate sense'. The two
statements cannot both be true.
Nevertheless, we can notice that the range of
application of interpretation is broadened. In
traditional hermeneutics before Droysen, interpretation
applied only to written texts. But nowadays, the range
of application of modern' hermeneutics is not so confined.
As Gadamer put it, anything, verbal or nonverbal, can be
interpreted according to the method of hermeneutics.
These include what has been regarded as the subject
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matter of social science, such as human behaviour and
historical events.
Now the aim of hermeneutic interpretation is to
achieve understanding. And the objective of the human
sciences or historical knowledge, according to Gadamer,
is to acquire self-understanding. We now examine how
this act of understanding can achieve human
understanding. But beforehand, a note must be made about
the relationship between interpretation and
understandinq.
Interpretation is not an occasional additional act
subsequent to understanding, but rather understanding
is always an interpretation, and hence interpretation
is the explicit form of understanding. [17]
Thus, interpretation and understanding are two sides
of the same coin. But in actually interpreting a text or
text analogue, what kind of method does the
hermeneuticist employ?
Let us begin with what Gadamer called the structure
of understanding found at the basis of hermeneutics. It
concerns the circular relation between the whole and
its parts: the anticipated meaning of a whole is
understood through the parts, but it is in light of the
whole that the parts take on their illuminating
function. [18]
This circular relation between whole and parts is
analogous to the study of a script in a foreign language.
We obtain the meaning of this text only when we have
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found the 'perfect coherence' of the anticipated meaning
we formed of the text. In first reading, the interpreter
forms 'ideas' about the possible meanings of the text.
It is only through incessant re-reading that the
relations between the whole and parts of the script
become clearer. And the intelligibility of the text
presupposes its perfect coherence.
Moreover, perfect coherence presupposes not only
that the text is an adequate expression of a thought, but
also that it really transmits to us the truth. [19] In
other words, once the perfect coherence of a text is
determined, its meaning and truth also follow.
But how do we determine whether a text is perfectly
coherent? What is the criterion for the perfect
coherence of a text?
Gadamer's answer is that: We need not specify here
the rules of this critical examination since in every
respect their justification is inseparable from the
concrete understanding of a text. [20]
Hence, there are no general rules or criterion for
determining the perfect coherence of a text because:
Hermeneutics must start from the tact that
understanding is related to 'the thing itself' as
manifest in the tradition, and at the same time to
a tradition from where 'the thing' can speak to me.
[21)
Anything could be the subject matter of hermeneutics,
only that the hermeneutic way of study is the study of
'the thing itself': every hermeneutic understanding
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begins and ends with the 'thing itself'. [22]
The 'thing itself' is also what Gadamer called the
'historical object'. But in the real sense, it is not
an 'object' at all, but a 'unity' of 'mine' and 'other'.
[23] To put it in another way, the interpretation of an
'object' is a communicative relation between the 'I' and
the 'Thou'.
The 'I' is the interpreter, the 'Thou' is the
interpreter's relation with the text. The process of
interpretation is actually a dialogue. In other words,
an interpreter is always conversing with his text.
But, one may wonder, a text is not a person, how can
an interpreter converse with it? Gadamer replied:
One of the more fertile insights of modern
hermeneutics is that every statement has to be seen
as a response to a question and that the only way to
understand a statement is to get hold of the question
to which the statement is an answer. [24]
In other words, a text can be viewed as an answer to
a question. The task of hermeneutics is to 'get hold of
the question'. But how do we know what question which
the text is a response to? There can be a myriad of
possibilities.
The reply is this: we cannot know for certain. A
text is always a response to a question issued by its
author. The author's response presupposes a tradition
different from that of the interpreter. Likewise, the
interpreter's interpretation is based on his own
tradition. Both the interpreter and the author have
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their own prejudice which limits their own 'historical
horizon'.
From this point, there are two consequences. First,
interpretation is always on the way, [25] the
processes is endless, and thus can never be completed.
In other words the interpreter can never be certain of
the true meaning behind the text since he is a historical
being whose historicity cannot be overcome so that his
horizon is always bound by the tradition to which he
belongs. Hence Gadamer said of understanding as an
'adventure', and
that the hermeneutical experience has a far smaller
degree of certainty than that attained by the methods
of the natural sciences. But when one realizes that
understanding is an adventure, this implies that it
affords unique opportunities as well. It is capable
of contributing in a special way to the broadening
of one human experiences, our self-knowledge, and our
horizon, for everything understanding mediates is
mediated along with ourselves. [26]
Secondly, because of the prejudiced nature of
interpretation, we cannot sensibly speak of correct or
incorrect interpretations or understandings-- there are
only different understandings.
Thus, Gadamer admits that hermeneutic understanding
does not aim at objective knowledge, it only strives for
the 'fusion of horizons'. Since historicity is the
intrinsic nature of human being, it is impossible for him
to overcome his own tradition, hence, human opinions are
by nature prejudiced.
The problem is less to eliminate prejudice than to
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distinguish blind from true prejudices. Since:
We must raise to a conscious level the prejudice
which govern understanding and in this way realiz,
the possibility that 'other aims' emerge in their ow,
right from tradition-- which is nothing other tha
realizing the possibility that we can understan
cnmAi-h inn in ii-c-- M-hcrncbcc r D,7 l
Thus, blind prejudices are prejudices without
historical consciousness, whereas true prejudices
presuppose such consciousness and admit of the
possibility that we can understand something in its
otherness.
In sum, what we just discussed concerning the
understanding of the thing itself means that we must be
fully aware of the prejudiced nature of the opinions of
the interpreter, and that the interpreter must admit of
the possibility of understanding something in its
otherness.
But I think it is rather unclear to speak of
'understanding something in its otherness'. Perhaps it
means that the interpreter can understand something on
the perspective of the author of the text or any other
perspective or tradition different from his original one.
However, under this interpretation, there arises other
problems in Gadamer's theory of understanding. We shall
turn to these later.
From the above analysis of Gadamer's theory of
understanding, we can, according to Gadamer, obtain twc
conclusions pertaining to human self-understanding.
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First,
Self-understanding can no longer be integrally
related to a complete self-transparency in the sense
of a full presence of ourselves to ourselves. Self-
understanding is always on-the-way it is on a path
whose completion is a clear impossibility. [28]
Similar to interpretative understanding, when the
'object' of study is himself who undertake the study,
the process of understanding is endless. This is what
Gadamer called the 'finitude of self-understanding'.
Secondly, the activity of understanding is no more
an adventure than that of self-understanding. Both are
adventurous because they can attain a far smaller degree
of certainty than that attained by the methods of the
natural sciences. [29]
Yet, according to Gadamer, although the human science
of self-understanding cannot achieve the ideal of
objectivity of the natural sciences, the former is, so to
speak, dearer to the social sciences than natural
science.
Because the human sciences contribute to Human seer
understanding even though they do not approach the
natural sciences in exactness and objectivity, they
do contribute to human self-understanding because
they in turn are based in human self-understanding.
[30]
...it becomes nevertheless clear that only the vivid
thematization of human existence as 'being in the
world' discloses the full implications of
'Verstehen' as an existential possibility and
structure. The human sciences thereby attain an
'ontological' valence which could not remain without
consequences for their methodological self-
understanding. If Verstehen is the basic moment of
human in-der-Welt-sein, then the human sciences are
nearer to human self-understanding than are the
natural sciences. The objectivity of the latter is
no longer an unequivocal and obligatory ideal of
knowledge. [31]
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In short, hermeneutic understanding of human being
is more affiliated to the human self-understanding than
are the natural sciences, because the former is itself
based in human self-understanding. By this Gadamer means
that:
... understanding is not one among many modes of
action on the part of the subject but rather Dasein's
very mode of being. [32]
... understanding is never subjective behaviour
toward a given' object' but belongs to the effective
history of what is understood, to the history of its
influence in other words, understanding belongs to
the being of that which is understood. [33]
In other words, understanding must be based in the
tradition to which any interpreter belongs and that he
must be fully aware of this inseparable condition.
It is time we summarize this section before we
proceed to evaluate Gadamer's theory of understanding.
He sought to establish the following three theses:
First, that interpretation is the only proper method in
understanding human being.
Secondly, that interpretation grasps the uniqueness of
the 'object' being studied.
Thirdly, that interpretation is a method nearer to the
human self-understanding than is the natural scientific
method.
Common to these three theses, the main argument is
the thesis of historical tradition. That is, first, like
human experience, any opinions and judgements are
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historically bound, i.e. limited by the agent's
historical horizon. Secondly, the full awareness of this




In the present section, we shall concentrate on two
main lines in offering an evaluation of Gadamer's theory.
First, his claims against the Unity Thesis, or the
natural scientific method. Second, the tenability of the
method he suggested.
But before proceeding, we must first consider an
important side issue. In his Forward to the Second
German Edition of Truth and Method [34], Gadamer
maintained that he did not wish to revive the old
methodological debate between the natural and human
sciences. The issue is hardly one of contrasting
methods.... What we are concerned with here is not a
difference in method but a difference in the aims of
knowledge. [35]
I trust that he was honest in expressing this 'wish'.
But it does not render his theory immune from attacking
the methodology of the natural sciences. Nor did he
actually refrain from contrasting the methods of the
natural and human sciences. The only explanation for his
inconsistent words is that either he did not perceive the
implications of his theory or he has forgotten what he
formerly said.
Recall the beginning of this chapter: Gadamer argued
that the inductive method propounded by positivists like
Mill and Hume suffers from a 'dangerous abstraction' of
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its object of study it is dangerous because the method
does not take hold of the uniqueness of the object when
it proceeds to make generalizations. The object then
becomes a particular case under a general, abstractive
rule. The object is not being appreciated in its
singularity and uniqueness.
In short, the inductive method, although entertaining
a high degree of objectivity and exactness, failed in
grasping the true nature of an object. And this can be
done only by means of interpretation. The method of
interpretation is a method that grasps the uniqueness of
an object even at the expense of giving up the ideal of
objectivity and exactness.
Here the argument is actually in the form of a
dilemma: either a true understanding is obtained by
interpretation at the expense of objectivity, or
(exclusively) objectivity is achieved by means of
inductive method without attaining a true understanding.
Now if a dilemma between interpretation and inductive
method is not a contrast, then what is a' contrast'? And
if upholding the method of interpretation while excluding
the inductive method is not a methodological issue, then
what is a 'methodological issue'?
Gadamer's arguments''against the Unity Thesis, like
those of Winch, are entirely directed against the Thick
Thesis. It concerns whether the 'object' can be properly
explained rather than the logical structure of
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explanation.
Moreover, Gadamer repeatedly spoke of whether certain
'objects' can properly be studied by the method of
natural sciences. In denying this method, he proposed
the method of interpretation. But throughout the debate,
it has been taken for granted that we have a clear
meaning of the expression 'an object of study'.
However, as I have pointed out in the last chapter,
this expression suffers from systematic ambiguity. But
for the time being, let us leave the matter for a later
concluding discussion. Before this, we shall examine
Gadamer's proposed method for the human self-
understanding.
The central claim of the methodological superiority
of interpretation is that it is linked to the 'thing
itself'. The 'object' is being studied in its
uniqueness.
But as I have shown in the last section, this claim
of uniqueness is tantamount to saying that the
interpreter must admit that he is limited by his
historical horizon and so he must approach the 'object'
by attempting to 'dialogue' with its author in order to
attain a 'fusion of horizons'.
But I think here that Gadamer failed to perceive a
logical contradiction. On the one hand, the interpreter
is limited by the tradition to which he belongs. Yet,
the author of the object might have lived a different
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previous generation which belonged to a totally different
tradition. In other words, the author might have been
dead before the birth of the interpreter. The experience
of the author's living history does not overlap with that
of the interpreter.
Hence, it is impossible for the interpreter to study
the object in its 'otherness', i.e. in the author's
perspective. Because they live in different historical
traditions. And according to Gadamer's definition, it is
impossible to trespass a tradition which limits a
person's horizon.
Perhaps a careful reader would have noticed that the
concept of a tradition in Gadamer's theory has made bogus
identification of two different concepts: (1) the
chronological history that a person lived, (2) the
historical product that has moulded or socialized a
person, such as a culture, or an educational institution.
The two are clearly different, since the second may,
and actually often does, outlive the life of an
individual.
If 'tradition' means the chronological history of a
person, to say that he cannot understand another person
or object who lived a different chronological history is
either false or tautological.
On the other hand, if 'tradition' means the culture
or social system to which a person belongs, to claim that
he cannot understand another person or object who belongs
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to a different culture or social system is also either
false or tautological. Or perhaps a position of cultural
relativism is adopted.
But Gadamer always urges an interpreter to understand
an object in its 'otherness' to gain a fusion of
horizons. It is clear that he admits that it is possible
that an interpreter can trespass a 'tradition' in the
second sense of the word, i.e. culture or social system.
However, Gadamer also said that one's opinions must
presuppose his own tradition whose trespassing is an
impossibility. Now we can conclude, prima facie, that a
person can understand: (1) what he experienced in his
chronological history (2) what is passed over to him by
his own culture or social system (3) what is passed
over to him by a different culture or social system.
Perhaps (1), (2) and (3) together in conjunction
constitute a third sense of the word 'tradition'. Yet,
if this is so, we may wonder: what a person cannot
understand? What lies outside the tradition to which a
person belongs.
Obviously, a person cannot know everything about his
own culture, let alone an alien one. There must be some
'residue' even for the most erudite person. Perhaps it
is this 'residue' that lies outside the person's
'tradition'.
Thus construed, however, Gadamer's theory of
understanding amounts to the assertion that there must
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be something that we do not understand. I think that it
actually involves a tautology: we can only understand
what we can understand, and so we cannot understand what
we cannot understand.
If I am correct, the 'methodology' that Gadamer
expounds does not provide informative guidance in
studying human science. Nevertheless, it may not be a
shortcoming because Gadamer never wanted to develop a
system of technical rules that might describe, or even
direct, the methodological procedures of the human
sciences. The question is not what we do or what we
ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our
wanting and doing.. [36]
That which is 'over and above our wanting and doing'
is that we can only understand what we can understand and
the wish to understand something that we cannot
understand is unrealistic. But one may still find it





By now we have discussed the main issues between the
Unity Thesis and the separatist positions of Winch and
Gadamer.
There are two lines of thought throughout the debate.
The first concerns the separatist's attack on the Unity
Thesis. The second concern the Separatist's proposed
methods.
As to the first line of thought, I have pointed out
that both Winch and Gadamer have made attempt to refute
the Thick Thesis. They both maintain that the subject
matter peculiar to social science cannot be properly
understood in terms of the inductive method.
This attack, however, even if it is successful,
only refutes J.S.Mill's Thick Thesis, viz. all empirical
phenomena are explainable in terms of covering-laws. We
need not determine whether Winch and Gadamer have
succeeded in refuting the Thick Thesis, because the
kernel of the empiricist methodology consists in the Thin
Thesis.
The Thin Thesis concerns merely the logical structure
of scientific explanation and prediction. Whether
certain empirical phenomena are explainable is an
ulterior issue which is pertinent only to the Thick
Thesis.
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However, the arguments of Winch and Gadamer have been
against the Thick Thesis. Thus they even failed in
proffering relevant arguments in their debate with the
empiricist. Whereas empiricist like Hempel is concerned
with explicating the logical structure of scientific
explanation which has nothing to do with the extent to
which empirical phenomena can be explained, Winch and
Gadamer put much of their efforts in arguing that certain
social phenomena cannot be explained or predicted. The
empiricist notion of methodology is actually a semantic
explication of the concept of explanation. If the
separatists should raise relevant dissent, they must
point out what goes wrong with this explication. But as
we have seen, they seem even failed to perceive that the
empiricist methodology is a semantic notion.
On the other hand, as we have shown, the methods
offered by Winch and Gadamer are themselves problematic.
Winch's method is what he called the method of
philosophical analysis. But I have pointed out that this
method is replete with conceptual confusions. Besides,
Maclntyre also pointed out that the scope of Winch's
method concerns only action-description terms. But it is
too narrow as what is properly called social sciences
includes concepts other than action-description terms.
If Winch insists that the scope he considered has
exhausted the appropriate subject matter of social
science, he still needs weighty arguments.
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As for Gadamer, his so called method of
interpretation is actually a tautology without any
informative guidance in the study of human science.
One problem common to both the separatists concerns
the systematic ambiguity of the expression 'an object
of study'.
Both philosophers have repeatedly said that the
'object of study' proper to social science cannot be
genuinely understood by means of the natural scientific
method.
Throughout the debate, the 'object of study' of
social science is viewed as a concrete object such as an
antique vase, and it is thought that this 'object' must
be approached by a particular way or method other than
the natural 'scientific method.
There are at least three different meanings in the
use of the expression 'object of study'.
First, it means, generally speaking, the range of
empirical phenomena in society and human history that
form the area the social scientists are interested in.
Secondly, it refers to the action-description terms
or action concepts available to a particular culture.
Thirdly, it means the explanandum of a particular
scientific theory. In this case, the 'object of study'
is either a statement describing a space-time specific
event or a sentential function representing the range of
a certain kind of phenomena potentially explainable by a
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theory. For instance, let (Fx' Gx)- Ex be a covering
law, where Ex is a sentential function that represents
the particular range of phenomena whose antecedent
conditions are specified by the law.
Winch and Gadamer, in their discussions of the
methodology of social science, have not given exact
meaning for the expression in question. They merely
reiterated that the 'object' cannot be studied by
inductive method.
When the 'object of study' takes the first meaning,
the issue suffers from the greatest unclarity, since the
phenomena forming the general interest of the social
scientists are so diverse and whose description can take
so many forms. Conceptualization has been the most
fundamental 'task of the scientists. The process of
conceptualization can be done before or simultaneously
with hypothesis making. But no matter how the scientist
do this, this belongs to the context of discovering
hypothesis.
Methodology, as the term has been so used, concerns
rather the context of justification. Perhaps we can
raise no objection if the term is used in a different way
which designates certain feasible procedures by which
hypothesis can be effectively discovered. But we cannot
see that the Separatists are suggesting 'methodology' of
this latter kind.
As we have seen in the first chapter, the covering-
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law theory of explanation is actually an explication of
the concept of scientific explanation and prediction.
'Methodology' as this theory implies concerns the logical
structure of justification and explanation. Moreover, it
offered the notion of scientific prediction a clear
meaning. And as we have made great emphasis, the power
of science, as we so use the term, consists in its power
of prediction.
While the Separatists propose a different methodology
for social science, the notion of a prediction was
considered to be despicable. Their conception of social
science has no room for prediction. They are of course
(in principle) free to propose new uses for the term.
Yet they must be aware that they are using the term
'science' in, a different way ---in such a way that their
'science', which has no power of predictability, may no





[1] This term is coined by Apel in his book
Understanding and explanation, see References.
[2] In Hempel Explanation in Science and in History
in Niditch (ed.), 1968, p.79.
[3] In Hempel 1965, pp.231-243.
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and Explanation in History, 1957.
[5] The interpretive sociology of Max Weber is an
important tradition in Interpretative Social Science. But
we shall not deal with this in the present study.
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social science consists in the 'meaning' of social
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theories reaardinq what is involved in this 'meaning'.
Chapter 1
[1] In Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy,
1951.
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when reason or justification is called for.
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the term is best used to include the probabilistic model
as well.
[4] This formulation is found in Hempel 1974
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[9] Note that in a probabilistic law, the occurence of
an event is not entailed by the law but supported only to
a certain degree.
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